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1.... [W]ithout the cooperation of the Marratas I could not ￿atter
myself with a certain prospect of the speedy conclusion as well as the
decided success of the war [against Mysore].
￿(Governor-General Cornwallis to Captain Kennaway, envoy to
the Nizam of Hyderabad, June 7, 1790).2
You can also remove all his apprehensions respecting the stability
of our treaties by stating to him that as all treaties which are made
in India must now be communicated to the King￿ s administration in
England, whose duty it is to take care that the national honor shall
not be injured by a breach of public faith, there will not be the least
risk that any future Governor-General will venture to infringe any
of the treaties that shall be concluded by me.
￿(Governor-General Cornwallis to Captain Kennaway, envoy to
the Nizam of Hyderabad, April 12, 1790.)3
1 Introduction
Why was the East India Company (commonly referred to as the Company)
able to conquer India? There are four explanations in the literature: (i) The
Company was militarily strong; (ii) Indian regimes did not trust each other
and hence could not collaborate against it; (iii) The Company had good mili-
tary intelligence; and (iv) Indian regimes were myopic, and did not anticipate
the long-term threat posed by the Company.4,5 In this paper we accept these
2From Poona Residency Correspondence, Volume III, p. 157.
3From Poona Residency Correspondence, Volume III, p. 102.
4Bayly (1999, p. 97) argues that the British "were able to conquer the Indian subcontinent
within a period of two generations because they commanded the Indian seas and the Bengal
revenues," but also goes on to emphasize the importance of its success in information gathering
and military intelligence. Gordon (1998, p.194) highlights the role of "credit, artillery, and
training."
5The introduction to Regani (1963, p. i), by P. Sreenivas Char, quotes M.S. Mehta on the
short-sightedness of Indian regimes: "It is a sad commentary on their sagacity and judgment
that they should have failed to understand the simple phenomenon that mutual enmity and
disunion were bound to destroy the sovereignty and independence which they so proudly
wished to preserve." A variant of this view (Stein 2001. p. 209) emphasizes the Company￿ s
organizational structure, arguing that in the middle decades of the 18th century Indian regimes
were "lulled" into a false sense of security because they were aware that authorities in London
2explanations, with the exception of the fourth (see below) but highlight the
importance of another factor: the credibility, even if less-than-perfect, of the
Company￿ s commitments. We trace this credibility back to the Company￿ s in-
stitutional structure, in particular the constraints imposed on its Indian o¢ cials
by superiors and critics in London.
While we believe our argument applies fairly broadly for the century-long
period of conquest, we primarily make our case by examining a key episode in
the late 18th century, the Third Mysore War (1790-92) in which the Company
decisively defeated the Indian regime (Mysore) that has been described as its
most "formidable and most determined foe" (Moon 1990, p. 291). Indeed
Thompson (1943, p. 4), in his classic work The Making of the Indian Princes,
writes that "Haidar and Tipu [the two rulers of Mysore, father and son] brought
the East India Company nearer to ruin than any other Indian foes had brought
it, and nearer than any subsequent foe was to bring it." The striking feature of
this defeat of Mysore is that it was accomplished with the help of the Marathas,
the only other non-European power on the subcontinent on par with Mysore6.
Given their subsequent conquest by the Company, this decision by the Marathas
is puzzling. Didn￿ t the Marathas recognize that they were next in line? Indeed,
even some contemporary observers were surprised by their decision to ally with
the Company. In 1792, after Mysore had been defeated by the Company and its
allies, French observers in Pondichery commented that "at last both Nizam [of
Hyderabad, see note 5] and the Marathas must surely have their eyes opened,
and begin to see how unwise they been in warring against Mysore, thereby en-
feebling the only power ￿ qui puisse en imposer aux anglais￿[that would impress
the English]" (Thompson 1943, p. 4).
Our explanation of the Marathas￿behavior proceeds in the following steps:
(i) In the late 1780￿ s the Company did not have an overwhelming military
advantage over Mysore ￿it needed the Marathas￿support; (ii) The Marathas
were not myopic ￿they knew the Company could, after defeating Tipu, turn
(with oversight over the Company in India) were conservative, and opposed to risky warfare.
6The Company￿ s "Triple Alliance" against Mysore also included the Nizam of Hyderabad,
a much weaker player, who we discuss below.
3on them; (iii) Therefore, to win the Marathas￿support the Company had to
make some credible promises; (iv) The Marathas took the Company￿ s promises
(written agreements) seriously because they knew its o¢ cials were answerable
to London, where superiors and critics would frown upon contractual violations,
whereas they had little reason to trust Tipu Sultan￿ s commitments; (v) Ex-post,
the Company did show some restraint, as expected. Thus the constraints on
the behavior of Company o¢ cials in India, even given their limits, were key to
its success.
Establishing motives is intrinsically di¢ cult ￿ we usually observe the de-
cisions of various players (in our case the Marathas￿decision to ally with the
Company), but not the thinking behind them (in our case, the Marathas￿trust
that the Company￿ s commitments had some value). In the case examined in this
paper, however, we are fortunate to have access to the Poona Residency Cor-
respondence, letters exchanged between the Company￿ s Governor-General and
his representative to the Marathas￿court in Poona, as well as other communi-
cation. These provide a blow-by-blow account of years of negotiation between
the Company and the Marathas. This allows us to show that the Marathas
knew the Company￿ s institutional structure, and had some reason to think its
agreements could not be lightly abrogated. Of course, as mentioned above, we
also follow through and discuss the extent to which Maratha expectations were
borne out.
The following ￿ve sections of this paper ￿ esh out each step of our argument.
The next section provides some historical background regarding the Company￿ s
history in India and establishes its need for help in the crucial Third Mysore
War. The following section shows that the Marathas were thinking strategically
￿they were keenly aware that the Company could turn on them subsequently.
To clarify the third step of our argument we present a simple game-theoretic
model which shows that in a three-person game the strongest player can never
￿nd an ally unless he has some commitment ability. The next section returns
to the history, and describes the sources of this commitment ability. We ￿rst
show that the Company in India was restrained by London, and then that the
4Marathas were aware of the in￿ uence of London, which gave the Company￿ s
treaties some weight. We then turn to the aftermath of the Third Mysore War,
and to events of the 19th century, arguing that allies of the Company had, at
least from the point of view of narrow self-interest, placed the right bet; their
ex-ante expectations were not so far o⁄ the mark. The ￿nal section discusses
other 19th century events which we view as consistent with our argument, and
concludes the paper.
2 The Company and its Rivals, 1785-1800
2.1 The Regimes
The English East India Company had operated in India since the early 17th
century, initially as a purely commercial enterprise. The unstable political en-
vironment motivated the Company to develop its military strength to protect its
trade, and to fortify its trading settlements. Over time, local rulers found it ad-
vantageous to seek the Company￿ s help in various military disputes. Still, until
the mid-1700￿ s the Company￿ s explicitly military/political role was small. How-
ever, competition with the French Company for local political in￿ uence drew the
Company into Indian politics, and it was emboldened by its military successes.
In 1757, after disputes with the Nawab of Bengal, the Company rather easily
won the famous Battle of Plassey, and over the next decade consolidated its
control of Bengal. It also defeated, and established as a client state, the North
Indian state of Awadh (1764). However, militarily speaking, the Company had
a long way to go before it controlled the subcontinent. There are were at least
two other militarily formidable players: the Marathas, and Mysore. A fourth
player, the Nizam of Hyderabad, who ruled a large area Southern India, also
features prominently in the literature, but is usually considered unimportant in
the military sense. This paper therefore focuses on the strategic behavior of the
Marathas, the Company, and Tipu Sultan. However, we do comment on some
aspects of the Company-Nizam relationship, because they are revealing as to
5the Company￿ s credibility.
The Marathas, who emerged in opposition to the Mughals in the 17th cen-
tury, are often referred to as a "confederacy." Beginning with a centralized power
structure, with its base in Poona (in present-day Maharashtra) "centripetal ten-
dencies" (Gordon, 1998, p.54 ) had, by our period, led to the emergence of other
powerful Marathas players, including the Holkars, based in Indore (in the south-
ern portion of present-day Madhya Pradesh) and especially the Scindias, based
in Gwalior (in the northern part of present-day Madhya Pradesh). Still, the
Court of Poona was the "nerve-centre of the confederacy" (Sen 1974, p. 17).
Much of our discussion focuses on the Court of Poona, though we provide detail
on other factions, where appropriate.
Mysore (centered in present-day Karnataka) was the up-and-comer. In the
mid-18th century the Hindu regime of the Wodeyars had been undermined and
replaced by Haidar Ali, a Muslim mercenary, followed by his son Tipu Sultan.
In contrast with the loose-knit structure of the Marathas, Mysore was tightly
centralized around the authority of Tipu Sultan. Mysore was very e⁄ective in
raising taxes, employing harsh methods when required. This ￿scal success laid
the foundation for the expansion of its military.
The Nizam, based in Hyderabad (in present-day Andhra Pradesh), ruled
a "successor state," i.e. a province that had broken away from the Mughal
empire. Though large in terms of territory (though some of it was arid and not
very productive), it was, especially by our period, not very signi￿cant militarily.
After his tenure as Governor-General, Warren Hastings, on his way home in
1784, analyzed political conditions in India. He wrote of the Nizam that "his
military strength is represented to be most contemptible" (Thompson 1943, p.
1).
The various players, Company, Marathas, Mysore and Nizam were intermit-
tently at war in di⁄erent permutations and combinations from the 1760￿ s to the
1780￿ s.7 By the end of the 1780￿ s however, the Company had decided to elimi-
7Because the Nizam￿ s military strength was slight, and did not determine major military
outcomes, we have reduced discussion of his role.
6nate Tipu Sultan, who it viewed as aggressive and threatening to its possessions
in South India.8 In his turn Tipu viewed the Company as expansionist. War
between Mysore and the Company seemed inevitable. The key question was:
What would the Marathas do?
2.2 Military Strengths
The Company was the strongest power; there was a long history of relatively
small numbers of disciplined and well-armed and well-led Company forces de-
feating much larger armies.9 But the Company￿ s superiority over Tipu was
not overwhelming. By the 1780￿ s Mysore was growing in strength, and was
"arguably the strongest antagonist of the British" (Ramusack 2004, p. 66).
Mysore had held its own in con￿ ict with the Company in the early 1780￿ s, and
the Company￿ s prestige had diminished somewhat. Tipu had bested a coalition
of the Marathas and the Nizam in the mid-1780￿ s (Sen 1974, Hasan 1971). His
success is sometimes attributed to his adoption of European military tactics
and hardware (Brittlebank 1987, Hasan 1971). Moreover, the Marathas lacked
internal cohesion, whereas Tipu had a more uni￿ed force, which he personally
commanded.
The potential threat from Tipu was also periodically enhanced by the fear
that he would receive assistance from the French, though by the 1780￿ s the
French were not militarily important in India. The Company￿ s own perception
was that if it attacked Mysore it would probably win, but it could do with
some help. In the build-up to the decisive con￿ ict with Tipu Sultan, the Third
Mysore War, Governor-General Charles Cornwallis wrote to Charles Malet, his
emissary to the Marathas￿court in Poona on January 27, 1790 (Poona Residency
Correspondence, Volume III, p. 55) emphasizing the importance of their sup-
8Henry Dundas, at the head of the Board of Control [discussed in section 5.1] in London,
wrote to Cornwallis on November 13, 1790: "I ardently wish for the annihilation of that
restless tyrant, for while he exists, there can be no certainty of peace in India..."(Sen 1974, p.
87).
9One of the Company￿ s strengths was its superior artillery. Indian regimes could employ
these weapons, and could hire Europeans (e.g. French) to man them. However, they were
prone to desert at crucial times, especially if the opponent at hand was also European (say,
the Company), and if political relations between the two European powers improved.
7port: "It is unnecessary to explain to you that the cooperation of the Marathas
in this contest would be of the greatest importance to our interests..." On April
26, he again argued on similar lines(Poona Residency Correspondence Volume
III, p. 146):
I need hardly state to you that though it would be desirable to
obtain terms of precise equality in our treaty with the Marrattas, yet
as their hearty and early cooperation with us is of utmost importance
to our interests, I would even designedly give them some advantage
rather than retard the commencement of operation of their forces.
Similarly, in a letter to Pitt in 1790 (Sen 1974, p. 98) another Company
o¢ cial wrote:
The su¢ ciency of our military force in that part of the world,
for such an undertaking, is, I conclude, unquestionable; but the re-
sources for the inevitable expenses, and for supplies of stores and
provisions, necessary for so important an undertaking, must be less
certain. It will be fortunate if the politics of the two courts, of the
Marathas and the Nizam are found su¢ ciently steady to be counted
upon, in the pursuit of a great political plan.
The "great political plan" came to be: the central component of the Maratha
confederacy, the Peshwa in Poona, formed an alliance with the Company and
the Nizam of Hyderabad, and played an important role in defeating Tipu in
the Third Mysore War10. At the end of this war Tipu surrendered as much as
half of his territory. He remained in power, much weakened, and the Company
eventually delivered the coup de grace in the Fourth Mysore War in 1799 when
Tipu was killed. The Peshwa￿ s minister, Nana Fadnis, could see what would
10Of the other two main players in the confederacy, Scindia stayed out, but supported
Poona￿ s decision to join. In a letter to the Court of Directors describing the negotiations that
led to an alliance with the Peshwa in Poona, Cornwallis made it a point to mention the role
of "Mahratta Chief Mahadji Scindia who, we believe, contributed by his own representations
to forward the alliance" (Poona Residency Correspondence II, p. 521, letter 364). The third
important player, Holkar, did not approve of the alliance, and kept out.
8follow (Sardesai 1968): "Tipu is ￿nished; the British power has increased; the
whole of East India is already theirs; Poona will be the next victim...There
seems to be no escape from destiny." This is the same Nana Fadnis whose agent
had negotiated the treaty with the Company before the Third Mysore War. Why
had the Marathas allied with a power that was, within a decade, perceived as
such a threat?
3 Were the Marathas myopic?
A possible explanation for the behavior of the Marathas is that they were just
naive, and did not anticipate the future threat posed by the Company. There
is ample evidence that this was not the case.
For instance, Nana Fadnis, the Poona Peshwa￿ s minister had written to
Haidar Ali, the ruler of Mysore in 1780, regarding the Company:
Divide and Grab is their main principle....They are bent upon
subjugating the states of Poona, Nagpur, Mysore and Haidarabad
one by one, by enlisting the sympathy of one to put down the others.
They know best how to destroy the Indian cohesion.11
Similarly, Ahilyabai Holkar, at the head of an important component of the
Maratha Confederacy had earlier warned of the risks of allying with the Com-
pany:
Other beasts, like tigers, can be killed by might or contrivance,
but to kill a bear it is very di¢ cult. It will die only if you kill it
straight in the face, Or else, once caught in its powerful hold, the
bear will kill its prey by tickling. Such is the way of the English.
And in view of this, it is di¢ cult to triumph over them.12
11Quoted by Ray (1998), p. 519.
12Cited by Kamath and Kher (1995, p. 126).
9The reader will also see below, as we discuss the negotiations that preceded
the Third Mysore War, that the Maratha negotiators were far from naive. In-
deed, they were thinking strategically (and in the British view opportunistically)
at every step. Why did the Marathas, if they were strategic thinkers, join the
Company? We argue that this is because the Company￿ s promises had some
credibility. The next section of the paper makes this argument analytically: in
a three person game the strongest player can ￿nd an ally only if its promises
have some teeth.
4 A Model Of Coalition Formation
Consider a world with three risk-neutral players: the Company (player 1), Tipu
(player 2) and the Marathas (player 3). These players are assumed to be in
a con￿ ict with each other over division of a surplus which we normalize to 1.
To this end the players can ￿ght wars, either individually or in alliance with
each other. In a war, the faction which emerges victorious survives into the
next period and the losers are eliminated.13 When peace is established ￿either
because a sole victor emerges, or because there is no incentive for the remaining
players to ￿ght further ￿ the surplus is divided amongst the ultimate set of
survivors.
Each player i is endowed with military strength which we represent by a
scalar pi 2 (0;1) such that
P
i pi = 1: Military strengths in￿ uence the probabil-
ity of winning as follows: if a subset of players with collective military strength p
goes to war against another subset with collective strength p, then the probabil-
ity of the former emerging victorious is given by a function F(
p
p+p0). The proba-
bility of the latter emerging victorious is F(
p
0
p+p0) which is equal to 1￿F(
p
p+p0):
We further assume that F(￿) is an increasing function with F(1
2) = 1
2: The rel-
ative military strength also in￿ uences the default division of surplus amongst
the ultimate set of survivors.14 In particular, we assume that if I ￿ f1;2;3g is
13Alternatively, we can assume that the losers￿military strength is reduced down to zero
while the winners retain theirs.
14By default division we mean the division in the absence of any credible surplus sharing
10the ultimate set of survivors after the war(s), then the default share of surplus




This means the surviving players receive surplus in proportion to their military
strength. The players who do not survive to the end get 0.
While both the probability of winning and the default share of surplus are
increasing functions of military strength, we assume, as seems natural, that
Assumption 1 F(
p
p+p0) > (=) p if p > (=)p0:
This assumption implies that the militarily stronger player gets a greater
expected payo⁄ by attacking the weaker faction than by maintaining peace. An
immediate implication of this assumption is that if there are only two players
remaining, then in absence of any previous agreement, the stronger player will
attack the relatively weaker player.15
In the following analysis we assume that there is a war between players 1
and 2. Player 3 can either stay neutral or join one of the players. We will
examine how player 3￿ s incentives are a⁄ected by player 1￿ s ability to make
credible promises regarding the post-war outcome.
4.1 No commitment ability
This sub-section analyzes the incentives of the three players in the absence of
any commitment ability. The lack of credible commitment ability means that
any player i cannot promise player j that he (i) will not attack him (j) in
future, nor can any player promise a division of surplus in a manner other than
the default division described above.
arrangement.
15Of course, this is not always true. War leads to deadweight losses and a stronger player￿ s
victory may come at too high a cost; in such a situation a war might not occur. In our
context, though, as described earlier, wars were frequent, and deadweight losses do not seem
to have been a deterrent.
11Motivated by the description in the previous section, we assume that the
military strengths of the three players are as follows:
Assumption 2 p1 > p2 > p3 :
This assumption states that the British were militarily the strongest and
the Marathas were the weakest. The reader should note that, while we believe
this to be the correct ranking, the arguments of the paper do not depend on
the relative ranking of the Marathas and Tipu Sultan, i.e. we could make the
Marathas player 2 and Tipu Sultan player 3, and the argument would still hold.
Given that players 1 and 2 are at war, player 3 has three options: he can
stay neutral, or join player 1, or join player 2. We will examine each of these
options.
Stay Neutral In this case player 3 and the winner of the 1-2 war will survive
into the next period. However, as described above, the victor of the 1-2
war, being stronger than player 3, will have an incentive to attack him.














Ally with player 2 If player 3 allies with player 2, their chance of surviving
the war with player 1 is F(p2 + p3): However, in the next period player 2





Ally with player 1






12Observe from equation (1) that player 3￿ s expected payo⁄ from remaining neu-




p2+p3). It is therefore bigger
than the smaller of the two terms, viz. F(
p3
p1+p3): Also, as seen from equa-
tion (3), player 3￿ s expected payo⁄ from allying with player 1 is smaller than
F(
p3
p1+p3): It follows that
Remark 1 In the absence of commitment ability it is never in the interest of
player 3 to ally with player 1. Player 3 will either remain neutral or ally with
player 2.
The above remark is the key to understanding the potential problems for
the Company in seeking alliances with local rulers. Given its relative military
superiority, the Company could have been unattractive as allies. The weaker
local powers could have preferred to either remain neutral or ally with each
other against the Company. While the above analysis is conducted in terms of
player 3￿ s incentives in case of a 1-2 war, similar analysis will show that in the
event of a 1-3 war player 2 has similar incentives ￿it is never in his interest to
ally with player 1.
Note that if player 2 had an ability to make credible commitment to not
attack player 3 in the future, then it further undermines the case for player 3 to
side with player 1. We have chosen the case most favorable for the Company
(Tipu Sultan has zero commitment ability) and will show that even with this
extreme scenario, the Company needed credibility to ￿nd allies..
4.2 Credible coalition promises
We now introduce the possibility of player 1 making credible commitment to
his allies. The commitment takes the form "if you ally with me against my
enemy, I will not attack you in the next period and give you a surplus X:" We
show that a necessary condition for such a commitment to be credible is that
there is a cost c1 ￿ 0 incurred by player 1 for violating it. In the next section
of the paper we describe the institutional sources that generated such costs for
Company o¢ cials in India.
13Suppose that player 1 has promised amount X to player 3 upon defeat of
player 2. Conditional on surviving into the second period, player 1 has the
following options and corresponding payo⁄s ￿1 and ￿3 for players 1 and 3,
respectively.
￿ Honor the promise. In this case we have
￿1 = 1 ￿ X and ￿3 = X: (4)
￿ Don￿ t honor the promise but don￿ t attack. Now player 1 incurs the cost
















Comparing the above equations, player 1￿ s promise is credible if







Given our assumptions, we know that the max in the equation above will be
attained at F(
p1
p1+p3) ￿ c1: Hence the condition for 1￿ s coalition promise to be
credible is
X ￿ 1 ￿ F(
p1
p1 + p3
) + c1: (7)
4.2.1 Player 3￿ s choice
Suppose player 1 has o⁄ered a credible X to player 3. What should he do, and
what are his corresponding payo⁄s (in the ex-ante sense)?
￿ Join player 1 and get
F(p1 + p3) ￿ X: (8)
14￿ Join player 2 and get


















Let Y denote the maximum of player 3￿ s payo⁄s from joining 2 or staying
neutral. Player 1 will be able to attract player 3 as a coalition partner by
promising an X such that






For a (1,3) coalition to be feasible the smallest X player 3 will accept must
be smaller than the largest X player 1 can credibly o⁄er:
Y
F(p1 + p3)












We know that by de￿nition Y ￿ (10), and we have argued earlier that
(10) ￿ F(
p3
p1+p3). Since F(p1 + p3) ￿ 1, the right-hand-side of (11) is positive.
Hence, equation (11) will be satis￿ed only if c1 is strictly positive. Thus, for
a (1,3) coalition (Company-Maratha), the Company had to have some cost for
breaking contracts.
Our model has demonstrated a simple point: if the Company was strong, but
not credible, it would not have found allies. However, if it had some credibility,
15and its rivals did not, it might well obtain allies. The Company￿ s envoy seems
to have employed an argument very similar to ours in negotiations with the
Marathas. At a di¢ cult point in the negotiations between the Marathas and
the Company, Charles Malet argued that even if the Marathas stayed neutral,
the Company and Tipu would still go to war. If the Company won, it might
o⁄er the Marathas something, but would not feel obliged to treat them well.
On the other hand, if they joined the Company, it would be generous in sharing
in the spoils. However, if the Marathas stayed neutral and Tipu Sultan won,
they could expect the worst:
I begged however that the minister in weighing this question [of
whether to stay e⁄ectively stay neutral by not compromising in the
negotiations] would naturally weigh the consequences and recollect
that the event of a separate war between Tippoo and the Company
would be the ascendancy of one party or the other. If it fell to the
Company, they would either make peace on their own terms or admit
this state [the Marathas] to a participation of the bene￿ts of that
ascendancy on their own terms, both of which precluded that recip-
rocal claim which was now o⁄ered to this Court. On the other hand
should Tippoo be successful against the Company, I left the Minister
to judge what progress the Marratas expected to make against this
power, con￿rmed and invigorated by such success... (Charles Malet
to Cornwallis, March 28, 1790, Poona Residency Correspondence III,
p. 93).
Malet￿ s argument seems to have prevailed. What was the source of the
Company￿ s credibility? The next section turns to this question.
165 The Company￿ s Credibility
5.1 Scrutiny of the Company￿ s Indian O¢ cials
The East India Company was a hugely in￿ uential and visible entity in London.
Employment in the Company was much sought-after and this gave it a source
of patronage. The Company￿ s shareholders, keen to protect their dividends,
were a vocal group. But as the Company began to acquire territory in India
it attracted criticism. There was considerable press reporting of corruption
and other abuses by the Company￿ s o¢ cials in Bengal in the 1760￿ s, including
allegations against Robert Clive, the famous general at the Battle of Plassey, and
later governor of Bengal. There was concern that the Company￿ s greedy o¢ cials
were impoverishing Bengal, which was expected to be a highly productive long-
term asset for Britain. This concern was intensi￿ed after 1771, when in a major
famine, as much as a third of the population of Bengal may have died.
Besides the press and the public, the Company￿ s o¢ cials in India were also
accountable both directly, and through their superiors, to more formal sources of
authority. There was the Company￿ s own Court of Directors, eager to maintain
pro￿ts and dividends, and avoid the heavy costs of war. But the Court of Direc-
tors was itself answerable to Parliament. The Company had often depended on
the King￿ s troops. More important, it had often approached the government for
what we would today call ￿nancial bailouts. This gave the government leverage
over the Company, in the form of the Regulating Act of 1773 and subsequently,
and especially relevant for us, Pitt￿ s India Act of 1784. Pitt￿ s India Act estab-
lished a "Board of Control" which supervised the Company￿ s administration,
trade, and diplomacy. Its most prominent member, Henry Dundas, served on
the Board from 1784 to 1801, and, according to Marshall (1968, p. 47) was the
equivalent of a Secretary of State for India.
A key clause in Pitt￿ s India Act explicitly discouraged war: it stated that "to
pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures
repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation" (Marshall 1968,
17p. 167) The Act also warned against alliances or treaties that were likely to
draw the Company into war in the future. The purpose was to ensure the
Company would go to war only in self-defence, or in defence of allies it was
already committed to.
There is ample evidence that the Company￿ s o¢ cials in India were acutely
aware of the scrutiny of London. Edmund Burke, the famous conservative and
critic of the Company published a description of an alleged massacre of civil-
ians by Company troops in a publication called the Annual Register in 1784.
The allegation was vigorously refuted, but its impact is re￿ ected in the fact
that Wilks (1810), a Company o¢ cial who wrote perhaps the best-known po-
litical history of South India of that period, still felt the need to address this
issue decades later. The best example of the accountability of Company of-
￿cials is, however, the famous, highly visible, and protracted trial of Warren
Hastings, the ￿rst Governor-General (1772-1784), upon his return to England
(Dirks 2006). Key articles of impeachment pertained to political decisions, not
just personal corruption. One allegation related to Hastings￿ s treatment of the
Raja of Benares, a Company client: Under ￿nancial pressure, Hastings had in-
creased his demands for taxes, beyond the contracted amount. Chait Singh had
resisted, negotiated, and ￿nally rebelled. Another charge against Warren Hast-
ings pertained to the demands he placed on the Begums (Queens) of Awadh, a
Company ally, again to obtain resources for the Company. For our purposes it
is not especially relevant whether or not Hastings was guilty (he was acquitted)
￿our point is he was answerable to superiors and political enemies in a way that
Indian rulers were not. Even Richard Wellesley (on whom more below), often
considered the most aggressive Governor-General, was vulnerable to his critics.
In 1804 he became enraged with a subordinate for reasons his personal secretary
explained as follows: "Whatever your motives may have been, your conduct has
certainly placed Lord Wellesley in a very embarrassing position...Your having
shown a great disposition to admit the justice of Scindiah￿ s right to Gwalior and
Gohud is likely, Lord Wellesley thinks to give his enemies in Leadenhall Street
room to found an accusation against Lord Wellesley of injustice and rapacity..."
18(Thompson 1943, p. 98).16
It is also clear that Pitt￿ s India Act￿ s injunctions against war were taken
seriously, especially by Charles Cornwallis, who arrived in India in 1786, and
was Governor-General in the period preceding and during the Third Mysore
War. When Cornwallis arrived in India he found that his predecessor, Charles
Macpherson, had committed to providing the Maratha Peshwa three battalions
to be used in defence of his territory, but not o⁄ensively. The Peshwa￿ s minister,
Nana Fadnis took this to mean the Company would help if the Peshwa attacked
Tipu to recover territories previously seized by him. Cornwallis wrote to another
o¢ cial in 1786 (Sen 1974, p. 47):
To my utter astonishment I ￿nd this Government pledged to lend
three battalions of sepoys from Bombay to the Marathas to defend
the possessions of the Peshwa, but not to act o⁄ensively against
Tipu....The business now is to get out of this scrape. I must de-
clare to the Marathas that I have brought particular powers and
instructions and that I cannot con￿rm that engagement of the for-
mer government as I am positively prohibited from interfering in the
disputes of any of the Country Powers except those whom we are
bound by treaty to assist.
Cornwallis stuck to this view despite the fact the Marathas, whose military
assistance he coveted, were o⁄ended17. However, he had his opportunity when
Tipu Sultan attacked Travancore (December 29, 1789). At the conclusion of a
previous con￿ ict a treaty (1784) had been signed between Tipu Sultan and the
Company, according to which the Raja of Travancore was explicitly mentioned
16We do not mean to suggest that Governors-General did not violate their agreements with
Indian regimes. This was especially true for Lord Wellesley, who became Governor-General
in 1798. Our point that is that Governors-General faced some constraints: A good example
of this is provided by Fisher (1987). In 1800 the Company was tempted to annex Awadh, a
rich but militarily weak region that had been its ally/client since 1764. The Company was,
however, restrained by the fear of reaction in London and India, so it annexed merely half of
Awadh! Thus, the Company in India acted in "constrained bad faith."
17On another occasion, Cornwallis restrained himself in a dispute with the Marathas, writing
to Malet that though military action was consistent with "the injunctions of the Act" it might
"occasion some alarm at home" (Poona Residency Correspondence, Volume II, p. 141, letter
dated May 5, 1789).
19as a "friend and ally" of the Company, whom Tipu was forsworn not to attack.18
Now that Tipu had, in Cornwallis￿view, violated the agreement, he felt free,
under the terms of Pitt￿ s India Act, to negotiate a treaty with the Marathas
against Tipu. Cornwallis now approached the Peshwa. He wrote to Malet to
tell the Marathas that "being now set at liberty by Tippoo￿ s breach of treaty,
we will further agree to contract a defensive alliance with them for the mutual
guarantee of the territories of which we may be respectively possessed at its
conclusion"(Poona Residency Correspondence letter # 60, volume 2, p. 55).
Thus, Cornwallis not only appears to have taken the injunctions of Pitt￿ s India
Act seriously, he seems to have repeatedly communicated to the Marathas its
in￿ uence on his decision-making. Indeed in another letter to Malet (Feb 28,
1790, Poona Residency Correspondence III, p. 78), he alludes to the fact that
"we have uniformly professed that unless Tippoo should violate the late treaty
of peace we were not at liberty to contract any alliances of an hostile tendency
to him."
5.2 Marathas￿Knowledge of Company￿ s Governance Struc-
ture
The discussion above suggests that the Company￿ s representatives themselves
had given the Marathas information about London￿ s supervision of their ac-
tivities. But there is also other evidence to suggest that the Marathas were
aware of the organizational structure of the Company, and sought to use this
information strategically. In 1778 Raghunath Rao, a Maratha chieftain and
former Company ally who had fallen on bad times composed a letter to the
English King appealing for support, and asking him to supersede the author-
18Article 1 of the Treaty of Mangalore began as follows: "Peace & friendship shall imme-
diately take place between the said Company, the Nabob Tippoo Sultan Bahadur & their
friends, and allies, particularly including therein the Rajahs of Tanjore & Travencore, who are
friends & allies to the English and the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, also Tippoo Sultan￿ s friends &
allies, the Biby of Cannanore, and the Rajahs or Zemindars of the Malabar coast, are included
in this treaty, the English will not directly or indirectly assist the enemies of the Nabob Tip-
poo Sultan Bahadur nor make war upon his friends or allies, and the Nabob Tippoo Sultan
Bahadur will not directly or indirectly assist the enemies, nor make war upon the friends or
allies of the English."
20ity of Company o¢ cials in India. Rao sent a team of emissaries to London to
deliver the letter to the King. The team, which reached in 1781, was strongly
supported by Edmund Burke (and other critics/enemies of the Company), who
housed them, and helped arrange various meetings. Still, the team was bounced
from set of authorities to another, and was eventually unsuccessful in obtaining
British support for Raghunath Rao. However, Fisher (2004, 661) reports that
"the mission gained valuable intelligence, especially highlighting the divisions
within British domestic politics." Indeed, the mission was remembered even a
century later, and its precedent was invoked to allow high-caste Hindus to cross
the seas without losing caste.19
The Marathas repeatedly invoked this knowledge in the buildup to the Third
Mysore War. Malet wrote to Cornwallis on June 3, 1789 (Poona Residency
Correspondence, Volume 2, 143).
At the same time Behroo Punt [the Peshwa￿ s negotiator] started
the old topic of this Courts￿sending a minister to England....I think
it su¢ cient to acquaint your Lordship that the design seems founded
on an idea that has been conveyed to this Court from some quarter
or other, of the distinction between the King and the Company and
of an opening thereby presenting of advantageously pursuing its in-
terests by a skilful [sic] conduct of its negotiations with the Company
or His Majesty￿ s ministry as circumstances might dictate...
Cornwallis responded to this letter on 26th August, 1789 (Poona Residency
Correspondence Volume II, p. 151) endorsing Malet￿ s e⁄orts to de￿ ect this
proposal, but also noting the following:
You may on all occasions assure the ministers with con￿dence
that although I am well convinced that the powers which have been
delegated to this government are fully adequate to every point of
19This was not the ￿rst time an Indian regime had attempted to go over the heads of the
Company administration in India. The Nawab of Arcot had done something similar in 1767
(Bowring 1899, p. 82).
21negotiation which is compatible with the present paci￿c system of
Britain, yet if they should be of opinion that any advantage could
arise to the Mahratta State by sending a deputation to England I
shall not only give my ready consent, but shall also be at pains to
procure a convenient passage for their envoys as well as an hon-
ourable reception for them upon their arrival in Europe.
Three months later, on (December 18, 1789, Poona Residency Correspon-
dence Volume 2, p. 161) Cornwallis returned to this issue:
I conceive it very consistent with the ￿nesse and cunning of the
Brahmin character to throw out occasionally their intentions of send-
ing their ambassadors to England without actually having any idea
of carrying this design into execution, but only with the hopes of
rendering this government more pliant from an apprehension that
the negotiation of any points on which di¢ culties may arise may be
carried from hence into another channel.
Clearly, the Marathas had some awareness of the checks and balances that
were central to the Company￿ s governance.
This discussion notwithstanding, our point is not that the Company was en-
tirely trustworthy, or that its commitments were taken at face value. It is merely
that its o¢ cials in India faced some restrictions on their behavior, whereas the
rulers of rival Indian regimes did not, and Indian regimes were aware of this.
In contrast with the Company￿ s Governors-General Tipu Sultan was not an-
swerable to anyone, and there are numerous examples of contractual violations
by him. In 1785, Tipu and the Marathas entered into a dispute involving the
taxation of a minor chieftain whose land, formerly in Maratha territory, was
now under Tipu￿ s control. After mutual threats and military mobilization by
both parties, an agreement was reached, which guaranteed the safety of the
chieftain. Du⁄ (1826, p. 5) reports that Tipu then practiced a "gross decep-
tion." The chieftain and his family were "treacherously seized; his daughter was
22reserved for the Sultan￿ s seraglio, and the rest were immured in a Cabuldroog
[a fortress] where they perished."20 Another example of contract violation oc-
curred after the war of the mid-1780s referenced above (Tipu Sultan versus
Marathas-Nizam) was ended by the Treaty of Gajendragad. Tipu immediately
violated the agreement and seized a region called Kittur. This incident was
later invoked by Charles Malet, persuading the Marathas to join the Company
against Mysore: "...[H]as he [Tipu] not lately infringed the treaty concluded
with you, and insulted your honour by the violent seizure of Kittor...?" (Sen
1974, p. 70). There was a plausible case to be made that the Company￿ s
commitments were reliable than Tipu￿ s and the Company￿ s negotiator seem to
have successfully done so.
5.3 The Nizam￿ s decision-making
The decision-making of the Nizam of Hyderabad, though not important in de-
termining military outcomes, is revealing regarding the relative credibility of
the Company and other regimes. As we have mentioned earlier, the Nizam
was the weakest of the four players; his long-term goal was survival, not ex-
pansion21. Tipu failed to acquire the Nizam￿ s support despite his appeals to
their shared religious background (Muslim) and even talk of inter-marriage as
a way of sealing their collaboration (Du⁄ 1826 Volume III, p. 41). Even more
remarkably, when the Triple Alliance (Company, Marathas, Nizam) was being
negotiated, the Nizam was concerned that if he joined the attack on Tipu Sultan,
the Marathas might attack his capital when his troops were away, and sought
guarantees from the Company that it would protect him in that eventuality
(Cornwallis to Captain Kennaway, Poona Residency Correspondence III, April
20Tipu Sultan is a much-vili￿ed ￿gure in Indian history, and we should worry about "orien-
talist" descriptions of him, especially by contemporary British writers However, this incident
is described in a similar manner by Sardesai (1968, Volume 2, p. 178), considered a standard
source on Maratha history. And in any case, for our purposes, it is the perceptions that
matter.
21Even during the Third Mysore War Malet wrote to Cornwalli (Sept 14, 1791, Poona
Residency Correspondence II, p. 215: "....[S]ince your Lordship will have collected from dear
bought experience of the Nazim￿ s force that his Hs.￿ s weight must be derived more from
management than e¢ cient power, and that while the Peshwa￿ s object is predominance, his is
safety; in a word that the Peshwa is our rival in power, the Nazim a candidate for security..."
2312, 1790, p. 102). Cornwallis￿ s view was that to include such guarantees in
the treaty would be insulting to the Marathas but he told his envoy to tell the
Nizam "in the most explicit terms" that if he lived up to his end of the bargain,
the Company would protect him. Finally, as we noted at the beginning of this
paper, to reassure the Nizam of the credibility of his own (treaty) commitments,
he explained the Company￿ s accountability to the King in England.
6 Did the Company honor its commitments ex-
post?
The Third Mysore War was long and hard-fought, with a Triple Alliance (Com-
pany, Marathas, Hyderabad), taking on Tipu Sultan. Hostilities e⁄ectively
began on December 29, 1789, when Tipu Sultan attacked Travancore, the
Company￿ s ally. After two years of struggle, Tipu ￿nally acknowledged defeat,
and opened negotiations for peace on February 6, 1792. He had to surrender as
much as half of his territory. We have argued the decision by the Nizam and
the Marathas to ally with the Company was a rational choice ￿they had some
reason to believe the Company would live up to its commitments. Were their
expectations met? During the course of the war the Company was at various
points unhappy with foot-dragging by its allies, and felt it had done the lion￿ s
share of the ￿ghting.22 However, when it came to the distribution of the spoils
of war, the Marathas and Nizam did well. Tipu￿ s territories were assessed to
have a revenue of 24 million, of which he surrendered one-half. Each of the
allies received areas with revenues worth four million (Forrest 1970, p. 192).
The Marathas received Dharwar, a region they and Tipu had repeatedly fought
over.
At the end of the Third Mysore War Tipu was considerably weakened. As
22Malet wrote to Cornwallis in 1791 that he was "apprehensive that you will experience
a strong tendency on the part of the allies to evasion and delay in commencing the oper-
ations....[consistent with] their object of reducing, rather by holding up in terror than by
striking the dreaded blow, the enemy to their terms..." (Poona Residency Correspondence
III, p. 511). And indeed, in the Company￿ s perception, that is precisely how events played
out.
24Ray (introduction to Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol, III, p. xix ) puts
it his "real power" was gone and he was left "utterly crippled." The coup de
grace was delivered by the next Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, who adopted
a very aggressive posture, in 1799, in a short war, lasting only two months.23
The Nizam of Hyderabad again allied with the Company24. The Marathas
dilly-dallied, entertaining emissaries from either side ￿before they could make
up their minds, Tipu Sultan had been killed. Still, at the point when it really
mattered (1790-92), the Marathas had allied with the Company, as had the
Nizam.25
How did the Company treat the Maratha Peshwa and the Nizam after the
Fourth Mysore War of 1799? At this point Tipu Sultan was dead, and the British
installed a new puppet regime in Mysore. For his (very limited) contributions
to the Fourth Mysore War the Nizam of Hyderabad shared substantially in
the spoils.26 Though the Company could easily have taken over Hyderabad,
23Company troops, led by General Harris, crossed the border into Mysore on March 4, 1799
(Forrest 1970, p. 275); Tipu Sultan was killed on May 4.
24Not without some persuasion. In 1795 the Nizam and the Marathas had gone to war.
The Nizam believed that the Company had committed to protect him in this eventuality.
However, the new Governor-General, John Shore, a cautious man, believed he had been
given (by London) a mandate of non-interference in the a⁄airs of "Native powers." Also,
as mentioned above, Cornwallis had been careful in crafting the treaty preceding the Third
Mysore War ￿the parties were committed only to protecting each other from Tipu Sultan,
not from each other. Finally, the Company was in deep ￿nancial straits, and in no position to
go to war (Furber 1933, p. 8). The Nizam was easily defeated by the Marathas, and having
lost faith in Company protection, resorted to building up a contingent of French troops. It
took considerable persuasion by Governor-General Wellesley to bring the Nizam back into the
Company￿ s fold for the Fourth Mysore War.
Can the Company￿ s behavior in this instance can fairly be called breach of faith? The
Nizam certainly appears to have believed this. However, even going by his interpretation,
the Company￿ s long-run behavior is not inconsistent with our argument. As we will discuss
below, the Company did at least abide (for 150 years) by its own commitment not to attack
the Nizam.
25The Marathas￿ de facto neutrality in the Fourth Mysore War can be in principle be
understood in the framework of our model. With the aggressive Lord Wellesley as Governor-
General, British credibility may have fallen, making them less attractive allies. We have also
argued in section 4.1 that player 1￿ s strength could make him a less attractive ally, and indeed
the Company had gained considerably in strength in the 1790s. We do not wish to push this
interpretation too hard, though. It appears that the Peshwa was being pushed by Nana
Fadnis to ally with the Company, but pressured against this by Scindia, who now feared the
strength of the Company. The Company￿ s own historian (Du⁄ 1826, Volume III) highlights
the importance of the personal qualities of the Peshwa, who he views as untrustworthy and
indecisive. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the Peshwa himself had been
severely weakened in internicine warfare among the Marathas ￿more on this below.
26After Tipu Sultan￿ s death the Company restored the (Hindu) Wodeyars to power in
Mysore. Some of the territory was seized and shared by the Company and the Nizam. After
25the Nizam and his descendants remained in power all the way up to Indian
independence, in 1947. To be sure, the Company extracted surplus from him
by various means; the most common method was to insist that he pay for a
military contingent under the Company￿ s control. But the Company still had
to worry about its critics and could not act entirely arbitrarily. And after the
takeover by the Crown (1858, see below), Hyderabad￿ s position became more
secure. Towards the end of British rule Thompson (1943, p. 13) wrote that
Hyderabad was "in a class apart from the other Indian states"; the Nizam was
referred to as "His Exalted Highness" and "Our Faithful Ally." This was not a
bad outcome for a regime which, as we have seen before, Warren Hastings had
described as "militarily contemptible." Over the long haul, it does appear that
by allying with the Company, the Nizam of Hyderabad had made a good bet.
The commitments it had made to the Nizam did have some substance after all.
The case of the Maratha Peshwa is more complex, for two reasons. First,
unlike the Nizam of Hyderabad, who had (albeit after considerable persuasion)
joined the Company in the Fourth Mysore War, the Peshwa had stayed out.
From the point of view of the Company this violated the terms of their prior
agreements. Second, the status of the Peshwa changed because of ferocious (and
puzzling) internecine con￿ ict among the Marathas.
After the Fourth Mysore War, even though the Peshwa had remained neutral,
Lord Wellesley o⁄ered him some of the territory seized from Tipu Sultan in
exchange for entering a "subsidiary alliance." This was an arrangement under
which the Peshwa would maintain Company troops at his expense and defer
to the Company in the management of his relations with other powers. The
Peshwa resisted this until 1803, when after defeat in war with the Maratha chief
Yeshwantrao Holkar, he was driven to take Company protection. The Treaty of
Bassein, 1803, in which the Peshwa accepted a subsidiary alliance, now split o⁄
the Peshwa from Scindia and Holkar, whom the Company subsequently fought
and defeated separately. Over time, the Peshwa chafed against his subordinate
deductions for Tipu Sultan￿ s relatives and generals, the additionl revenue was shared equally
by the Company and the Nizam (Forrest 1970, p. 307).
26status, and the Company in turn followed its traditional policy of turning the
screws on its partner in the subsidiary alliance. Eventually, the Peshwa and
the Company went to war in 1818, and the Peshwa was defeated. It is striking,
though, that even then he was given a substantial pension, amounting to an
annual amount of Rupees 2,210,000. This is when the net revenue of the area
formerly administered by him was 9,969,700 (Fisher 1991, p.192); this works
out to almost 23%, a very substantial amount for a defeated adversary. This
is consistent with the view we have expressed earlier: the Company might act
in bad faith, but there were constraints on its behavior. The Peshwa had lost
his crown, but if he was to be at the mercy of an adversary, the Company was
probably his best bet. Thus, the initial decisions by the Nizam of Hyderabad
and the Maratha Peshwa to ally with the Company in the Third Mysore War
did not turn out so badly, allowing for the other uncertainties and vicissitudes
of the times.
7 Concluding Remarks
The history of the rest of the nineteenth century reinforces our argument re-
garding the importance of the credibility of British commitments. Over the 19th
century, as the Company became more secure in India, authorities in London
encouraged a more aggressive policy. In 1841 the Court of Directors told the
Governor-General not to give up any "just and honorable accession of terri-
tory" (quoted by Fisher 1996, p. 21). This policy was vigorously implemented,
especially by Governor-General Dalhousie (1848-56), and various Indian states
(such as Nagpur, Satara) were annexed under legal pretexts, and the catch-all
"misgovernance." Pensions of some deposed rulers were withdrawn, including
the one received by the son of the Peshwa. Finally, in 1856, Awadh, which
had been partly taken over in 1800, was now fully annexed. The Company
was also resented for its interference in indigenous religious and cultural prac-
tices, and its alteration of long-standing land tenure rights in some regions. The
Mutiny/Civil Rebellion of 1857 followed, in which Indian soldiers in the British
27army rebelled, supported by local populations in some areas, and deposed rulers
like the Rani of Jhansi and the ruling family of Awadh played important roles.
Many other Indian rulers (including the Nizam of Hyderabad) who had retained
their status remained loyal to the Company. The Rebellion was crushed, and
the Crown took over direct rule of India in 1858. The importance of British
commitments to Indian rulers was recognized, and Queen Victoria pledged to
respect their privileges. The "Native Princes" were recognized as allies of the
British Raj, and their position was henceforth secure. Evidently, the honoring
of promises, or at least some acknowledgement of the constraints they imposed,
was necessary not only for acquiring power, but also for retaining it.
While this paper has highlighted the role of the institutional structure in
giving the Company￿ s promises some credibility, we should also consider other
reasons why the Company may have been more credible than its rivals. One
is that the Company was a new regime, which had not yet had the time to
build up long-term enmities; this could have facilitated alliance formation. This
argument is a priori plausible, though we should note that repeat business
can generate cooperation as well. More to the point, there was a new regime
in Mysore too; Tipu Sultan was only second in line ￿the dynasty had been
founded by his father, Haidar Ali.
Fisher (1991) has argued that the relative restraint shown by the Company
in the treatment of defeated adversaries came from a cultural factor ￿the respect
for aristocracy among British elites. We view this explanation as complementary
to ours. We have argued that the Company o¢ cials in India feared the outrage
of critics and superiors in London; here we have a description of the cultural
roots of that outrage.
Finally, our analysis has an interesting relationship with the literature on
"sub-imperialism," the idea that far-o⁄ o¢ cials on the ground promoted con-
quest, even against the wishes of superiors in the home countries. We suggest
that in the Indian context the very accountability to authorities in the home
country made sub-imperialism more successful.
28Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Mike Fisher, Ian McLean, Jim Mahon, Darryl Paul,
participants at WEHC 2009 and NEUDC 2009, especially Roger Betancourt
and V. Bhaskar, for their insightful comments and suggestions. All remaining
errors are our own.
References
[1] Bayly, C.A.1999. Empire and Information: Intelligence gathering and social
communication in India, 1780-1870. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
[2] Bowring, Lewin B. 1899. Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan: And the Struggle
with the Musalman Powers of the South. Oxford at Clarendon Press
[3] Brittlebank, K. 1987. Tipu Sultan￿ s Search for Legitimacy: Islam and King-
ship in a Hindu Domain. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
[4] Dirks, N. 2006. The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial
Britain. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
[5] Du⁄, James Grant. 1826. A History of the Mahrattas, Volume 3. Lon-
don: Longman, Rees, Brown, and Greene. Reprint 2006. Elibron Classics
www.elibron.com.
[6] Fisher, M. 1987. A Clash of Cultures: Awadh, the British, and the Mughals.
Riverdale, Maryland: The Riverdale Company.
[7] Fisher, M. 1991. Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency Sys-
tem 1764-1858. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
[8] Fisher,M. ed. 1996. The Politics of the British Annexation of India 1757-
1857. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
29[9] Forrest, D. 1970. Tiger of Mysore: The Life and Death of Tipu Sultan.
London: Chatto and Windus.
[10] Furber, H. ed. 1933. The Private Record of an Indian Governor-
Generalship: The Correspondence of Sir John Shore, Governor-General,
with Henry Dundas, President of the Board of Control 1793-98. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
[11] Gordon, S. 1998. The New Cambridge History of India: The Marathas
1600-1818. Delhi: Foundation Books.
[12] Hasan, Mohibbul. 1971. History of Tipu Sultan, Second edition. Delhi:
Aakar Books.
[13] Kamath, M.V. and Kher, V.B. 1995. Devi Ahalybai Holkar: The Philoso-
pher Queen. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.
[14] Marshall, P.J. 1968. The Problems of Empire: Britain and India 1757-1813.
London: George Allen and Unwin Limited.
[15] Moon, P. 1990. The British Conquest and Dominion of India. London:
Gerald Duckworth and Co.
[16] North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Perfor-
mance. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.
[17] Ramusack, B.N. The New Cambridge History of India, III, 6: The Indian
Princes and their States. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
[18] Ray, N. B. ed. 1937. Poona Residency Correspondence: Volume III, The
Allies￿War with Tipu Sultan 1790-93. Bombay: Government Central Press.
[19] Ray, Rajat Kanta. 1998. ￿Indian Society and the Establishment of British
Supremacy, 1765-1818,￿ in P.J. Marshall ed. The Oxford History of the
British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century. New York: Oxford
University Press.
30[20] Regani, S. 1963. Nizam-British Relations 1724-1857. Secunderabad:
Swaarajya Printing Works.
[21] Ross, Charles. 1859. Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis,
Volume I. London: Albermarle Press.
[22] Sardesai, G.S. 1936. Poona Residency Correspondence: Volume II, Poona
A⁄airs 1786-87 Malet￿ s Embassy. Bombay: Government Central Press.
[23] Sardesai, G.S. 1968. New History of the Marathas, Volume III. Bombay:
Phoenix Publications.
[24] Sen, Sailendra Nath. 1974. Anglo-Maratha Relations 1785-1896. Delhi:
Macmillan Publishing Company of India Limited.
[25] Stein, B. 2001. A History of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
[26] Thompson, E. 1943. The Making of the Indian Princes. London: Oxford
University Press.
[27] Wilks, M. 1810.(1932). Historical Sketches of the South of India in an At-
tempt to Trace the History of Mysoor from the Origin of Hindoo Govern-
ment of that State to the Extinction of the Mohammedan Dynasty in 1799.
Mysore: Government Branch Press.
31